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Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, political and economic relations between Western
Europe and Russia have changed rapidly and now involve a great number of public and
private actors. These relations can be characterised as a many-sided process with
numerous advantages, but also one that reveals that there are severe problems involved
in developing ties that cross the former Iron Curtain. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is
a key concern in any discussion on economic integration, but has turned out to be one
such problem area.
This paper outlines an approach for the analysis of public-private relations East-West
integration. Particular attention is devoted to the multi-level dynamics of the EU’s
external relations and how it may be related to the development of transnational
business. Implications of earlier research on the Barents Euro-Arctic Region are
analysed with particular reference made to the relatively new Northern Dimension
initiative.2
Introduction
One of the crucial issues for European Union policy-making for many years to come
concern its integration with Eastern Europe and Russia. There are membership
negotiations with a handful of states already under way, others are waiting for access to
negotiations, the Balkan conflicts remain a worry, and Russian relations hover between
hope and despair. Although security matters tend to be on top of the agenda, the
prospects for integration largely depend on the development of economic relations. One
might argue over whether the driving forces of integration are political or economic, but
the dynamic between the two is undisputable. Political and economic integration has
been, and still are, closely linked to the development of the European Union and will be
so also in its developing its external relations.
Within the European Union, political processes are often discussed in terms of multi-
level governance, i.e. European politics is seen as shaped in interplay between different
tiers of government. The argument here is that such a perspective make sense also when
the external relations of the EU are analysed. In addition, the analysis should extend the
multi-level perspective also to include developments in transnational business, as a
crucial component in the understanding of prospects for east-west integration. This
paper deals with the multi-level dynamics of integration in relation to developments in
foreign direct investment (FDI), in an attempt to reveal some crucial aspects in the
development of the EU’s external relations with Eastern Europe and Russia.
In the second section, a theoretical framework for analysing political-economic
integration in the east-west context is outlined. The third section presents some of the
major findings from earlier research into the Barents Euro-Arctic Region.
1 The fourth
section thereafter scrutinises the EU’s strategy for eastward integration and in particular
with regard to the recently adopted Northern Dimension initiative. The final section
argue on the basis of earlier findings for an approach that places firms at the core of
future co-operation efforts and also make use of the multi-level potential in the EU’s
external relations.
Towards a Transnational Power-dependency Approach
A key argument here is that political co-operation efforts across territorial state borders
should be seen in relation to cross-border relations between societies. The suggested
approach belongs to the transnational relations perspective of political science.
2 If we
take business as an example, the simple idea behind the study of transnational relations3
was that transnational business activities had political implications in the sense that
sovereign states somehow had to relate to cross-border activities partly beyond their
immediate control. Focus was on sovereign states and their dealings with the problem of
growing transnational activity, but the reality of, for example, transnational firms and
their problems was not made part of the analysis.
3 In this paper, the transnational
relations perspective is adopted for different purposes, namely in order to reveal the
prospects for political co-operation to improve the conditions for transnational business
activity. In doing so, the analysis of transnational firms and their activities is as crucial
to the analysis as the analysis of political developments.
To wonder about the ‘looks’ of emerging patterns of interaction and the preconditions
for their emergence, inevitably draws attention to the concept of interdependence (cf.
Smith, 1994: 5). In its systemic meaning, interdependence is a property of the global
system where developments in different parts of the world depend on each other.
However, interdependence in its systemic meaning tells us little about the internal
dynamic of the process. Such ambitions require a focus on relationships between the
actors involved, i.e. an understanding that allows us to focus on the strategic, actor-
based meaning of interdependence. Interdependence is then understood as a state of
affairs when actors depend upon each other for satisfactory outcomes on any issue (s) of
concern (Jones, R. B. J., 1995). Interdependent relationships are thus costly for actors to
break (Baldwin, 1980:484; Keohane & Nye, 1989).
Obviously, an actor-based understanding of interdependence raises questions about the
qualitative content of relationships. What is needed, however, is an interpretative
framework that allows us to analyse these angles in terms of interdependencies between
actors. Inspiration is here drawn from the power-dependence theory of R. A. W. Rhodes
and the simple idea that actors (organisations) depend on each other for resources and
have to exchange resources for achieving goals.
4 A certain possession of resources
equip actors with a potential for achieving their goals, but outcomes are decided in
exchange processes. Following this logic, the development east-west relations must be
understood through the identification and analysis of existing, or emerging, resource
interdependencies. Bearing our particular focus in mind, this means resource
interdependencies among actors who are engaged in transnational business, or to some
extent devote their resources to the development of such activities. The deepening of
relations thus hinges on the existence of resource interdependencies among actors, their4
recognition of such interdependencies, and their ambition to exchange resources for
certain outcomes.
What then are the resources in question? This topic does not lend itself to complete
accounts, but examples are easily identified. Governments possess financial resources
for external relations, of which business activity might be an important aspect. To a
varying degree they also have the constitutional-legal resources to alter legislation and
other institutional features of the business environment. Legitimacy, authority and
access to decision-making process are other important resources at their disposal, and
potentially also information and expertise. Through education, science and technology,
industrial, trade, environmental, transport and communications and fiscal policies
governments affect the circumstances under which firms operate (cf. Wilks & Wright,
1987; Dunning, 1992; Brewer, 1993; Stopford, 1994; Sally, 1995; Shaffer, 1995).
Government bodies at different levels and in different political systems score differently
and might stand out as more or less interesting for other public and private actors.
Important resources at the disposal of firms include capital, jobs, knowledge and
technology. These resources might attract the interest both of governments and potential
business partners, but any investment hinges on a number of factors that firms cannot
control, which is why they might engage in exchange relationships with other actors,
including government bodies. The suggestion seems to be that there is a scope for
exchange relationships between firms and governments, although it presumes the
identification and recognition of benefits from such exchange.
Scholars engaged in the study of regional processes, whether domestic or across
borders, often emphasise the importance of close and substantial public-private relations
as a vital component in releasing the dynamics of regionalisation. Improvement of the
region’s economic performance and competitiveness bring together political and
economic actors in territorially based alliances (cf. Coleman & Jacek, 1989; Keating &
Jones, 1985; Cappelin & Batey, 1993; Leonardi, 1993; Ratti & Reichman, 1993;
Rhodes, M., 1995b; Keating & Loughlin, 1997; Keating, 1998). Territorial competition
over the resources of firms, fear of exploitation on behalf of host governments, and
uncertainty about government behaviour and conditions in general, might hamper the
chances of fruitful arrangements and an effective mixture of measures concerning
general conditions and more direct supportive or problem-solving activities. There is5
reason to believe that this, to a great extent, hinges on how governments perceive
resource-dependencies between them and transnational firms.
The Policy Networks of Multi-level Governance
There are several good reasons for using policy network analysis when dealing with
political-economic integration from the adopted perspective. Power-dependence theory
emerged within the field of intergovernmental relations, of which policy network
analysis was an original feature. A minimal definition of policy networks suggests they
are clusters, or complexes of organisations connected to one another by resource
dependencies (Rhodes, 1997: 37; following Benson, 1982). A certain
transnationalisation of politics, changing public-private relations, decentralisation and
fragmentation of the state, interdependence and complexity of social and political affairs
are some of the changes in modern political organisation which counts as reasons for the
recent upswing of policy network analysis (cf. Kenis & Schneider, 1991: 34). The
notion of policy network is thus also highly compatible with the transnational relations
perspective with its focus on linkages between inter and transgovernmental relations and
societal interests (cf. Risse-Kappen, 1995; also Atkinson & Coleman, 1992). Policy
network analysis has also become fashionable in the analysis of regionalisation, not
least in association with EU regional policy, and with the increasingly influential idea of
multi-level governance in the theorising on European policy processes (cf. Conzelmann,
1995; Heinfeldt & Smith, 1996; Hooghe, 1996). It is a generic term that includes a
variety of both stable and temporary constellations of actors, spanning from policy
communities to issue networks (cf. Rhodes, 1988; Peterson, J. 1995; Dowding, 1995).
In the context of east-west relations, the existence, or emergence, of transnational policy
networks would imply emerging structures for policy-making and recognition of cross-
border resource dependencies with respect to certain policy problems among actors.
Important to note, however, network characteristics, and not the characteristics of actors
involved, explain the impact of policy networks. Such an understanding is concerned
with policy networks as a particular form of governance (cf. Kenis & Schneider, 1991;
Kooiman, 1993). As a form of governance, policy networks are signified by
interdependence between public and private actors in policy-making, and mobilisation
of political resources between government bodies in situations where resources are
highly dispersed.
5 Case studies on policy networks have shown that they often have a6
core and a periphery, where the amount of resources and in particular economic position
and knowledge, decide where actors belong (cf. Marsh & Rhodes, 1992b: 255, 263).
In the context of European integration, policy networks have become associated with
the notion of multi-level governance.  Multi-level governance is of recent date and
seems to fill a gap in traditional integration theory, where the role of sub-national tiers
of government traditionally has been neglected (cf. Marks, 1993; Hooghe, 1995; Jeffrey,
1996; Östhol, 1996). The idea is straightforward suggesting that political processes,
instead of being shaped at the supranational level or just between national governments,
are shaped in interplay between supranational, national, and sub-national tiers of
government. Empirical inspiration have usually been sought in the European regional
policy field, where regional authorities gained increased influence on measures designed
to stimulate indigenous development in target areas and at the same time became part of
European policy-making and implementation.
6 Here, linkages between sub-national and
supranational authorities partly by-pass state governments (Marks, 1992: 209-214,
Hooghe, 1995). Authority is transferred to the supranational level and decentralised to
sub-national levels, spinning power away from state governments, but not necessarily
beyond the control of state governments that, for different reasons, might have an
interest in shifting authority to other institutions (cf. Marks, 1993: 392, 401; Marks,
1996: 33). Warnings against overstatements have been raised partly from within the
perspective, where observations seem to indicate a more ‘symbolic’ than operative
importance of the sub-national content in multi-level processes (Hooghe & Keating,
1994: 387; Le Galès & Lequesne, 1998). Due to differences between issue-areas and
institutional settings in different countries, the ‘looks’ of multi-level governance is
bound to vary from case to case (Marks, 1993: 404; 1996: 21). Economic importance,
political skills and administrative capacity to operate in institutionalised and informal
channels as well as sub-national tiers of governments ability to mobilise resources in
society are crucial in deciding their influence in multi-level governance (Anderson,
1990; Hooghe & Keating, 1994: 375, 388; Hooghe, 1995; Benz, 1996:19-20).
The potential dynamic lies in the emergence of a co-ordinated, multi-tiered approach to
regional development, where the de-activation of any tier of government means sub-
optimisation (cf. Rhodes, M., 1995c). In a case where co-operation processes span
across the external border of the European Union, multi-level governance becomes part
of the picture in as much as there is a supranational dimension to foreign and regional7
policy in a particular setting. Multi-level governance has a transnational dimension, but
little is known about the scope and potential of multi-level governance in such contexts.
What common sense reasoning would suggest, however, is that it may foster co-
ordination and a certain division of labour between different levels of government.
Linkages between different tiers of government in the field of foreign policy stand
central in a rather narrow, and slowly growing body of literature which discusses the
cross-border activities of sub-national levels of government in terms of paradiplomacy,
or localisation or domestication of foreign policies.
7 The point of departure here is that
when transnational relations grow in intensity and impact, it is only logical that sub-
national governments feel the need to respond to the effects of international
interdependence by developing their own foreign policy (cf. Duchacek, 1990:6-9; Kresl,
1992; Hocking, 1993: 26-29). The important point here, however, is that different tiers
of government might be more or less interdependent on each other for desirable
outcomes, which is why the power-dependence framework must be considered well-
suited for efforts at illuminating the scope and potential of regionalisation EU external
relations.
Transnational Firms and Their Activities
The analysis of transnational firms and their activities is based on the assumption that
prospects for deepened integration between the East and West of Europe are
significantly influenced by the preconditions for transnational business across divides.
Knowledge of the problem logic of the transnational business sphere makes it possible
to discuss political implications of these findings and to view political co-operation
efforts and other initiatives in the light of these. It is a matter of finding out what
problems firms face in our particular setting, how they affect business operations, and
how firms manage these problems. To a large extent this means generating knowledge
about the firm’s relations to actors affecting their transnational operations.
If we discuss business from the perspective of integration, in particular foreign direct
investment (FDI), as the most long-term and substantial form of transnational activity
on behalf of firms, deserve attention.
8  FDIs may be held as an ideal type of
transnational activity, but also non-equity and contractual forms of association,
sometimes labelled new forms of investments (NFIs), such as licensing agreements,8
franchising, sub-contracting, management contracts and joint-ventures indicate long-
term and substantial engagements (Stopford & Strange, 1993: 16, 48). Large
transnational corporations (TNCs) have for long dominated FDI activity, and continue
to do so, but in recent years also small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have
increased their FDI activity significantly (Camilleri & Falk, 1992: 69-77; Dicken, 1992;
Fujita, 1995). One obvious difference between TNCs and SMEs is, of course, the
resources they possess in terms of capital, personnel and most likely also knowledge,
which is bound to make SMEs less visible from the viewpoint of governments.
The resources of the firm itself in combination with those derived from both home and
host environments, leave the firm with certain choices concerning its organisation of
activities. To some extent their task is to decide whether cross-border resource
dependencies should be established, and if so, how they should be organised. Their
mode of operation will be influenced by earlier experiences and perceptions about the
conditions for operating in the foreign territory. Resource exchanges between firm units
may thus create more or less extensive patterns of resource dependencies to external
actors, some supportive and favourable in nature, others more problematic.
Beforehand not much can be said about the character of these relations except that they,
in line with previous the general approach adopted, might be multi-actor and multilevel
in character. Characteristics of relations in the business angle signal the status of their
business environment, interdependent business relationships are signs of a ‘healthy’
business environment while the absence of such relationships indicates less favourable
conditions. The political implication of this statement is that if interdependence between
actors in different societies does not occur, the societal foundation of integration is
weak. Under such circumstances, the question of what can be done about it remains,
which is what the policy side of the analysis must try to reveal.
The Euro-Arctic Lessons
9
It is well known that transnational business activities across the former Iron Curtain
have increased during the early post Cold War years, but also that they have done so
from very low levels, rising slower than many had expected and definitely hoped for (cf.
Statistical section of NEBI Yearbook 1999). A series of interviews with Nordic firms
sum up to a picture that clearly illustrates this hesitant development.
10 On the positive9
side, firms saw a great potential market for different types of knowledge, skills and
technology in Russia. Opportunities were not confined to activities in connection with
natural resource extraction, but concerned a broad spectre of branches and a variety of
activities. Many saw a promising market for goods and services to both households and
enterprises. Others saw the existence of a cheap and relatively skilled labour force as a
reason to start manufacturing in the area. In sum, firms operated in the area on different
grounds, perceived different opportunities, and went forth in their activities in different
ways. In common they had a strong belief in their competitive advantages as exploitable
assets, as well as a belief in the future value of being present in the Russian territory.
In stark contrast to these promising features, it was obvious that perceived opportunities
was surrounded by a complex and problem-oriented reality, where everybody crossing
the east-west divide faced tremendous challenges. The unfamiliar institutional and
cultural environment complicated, if not wiped out, firms’ possibilities to operate in a
rational and goal-oriented fashion. Legislation and other regulations surrounding
business activities were constantly changing or subject to unpredictable implementation,
particularly when local and regional authorities were involved. Instead of structuring
interaction and bringing predictability to business operations, unstable institutions and
cultural differences meant that business activity was circumscribed by uncertainty and
high risks. Although formal institutions were changing, and often for the better,
informal codes of conduct prevailed among Russian authorities and prevented
institutional changes from being implemented.
As a consequence, firms were careful about getting tied into relationships that would be
too costly to break. Despite having identified extraordinary opportunities, engagements
are usually kept at low level. Attempts at coming to grips with different types of
problems have often proved difficult. Beyond doubt, Nordic firms seemed to have little
to win in conflicts with Russian partners, no matter whether these were handled firm to
firm or whether the juridical system was brought in. There was a widespread opinion
among firms that local and regional authorities, as represented by the officers in charge,
were acting out of narrow self-interest. Bureaucrats were trying to win personal
economic gains by creating problems and then, for payment, solving them, or
alternatively, by trying to improve their financial situation by imposing arbitrary taxes
and fees on foreign firms. Firms found it difficult to understand Russian bureaucracy
and establish working linkages with it, which was somewhat alarming since they10
considered these contacts of vital importance for the conditions under which their
operations might be carried out. They did not consider political access as something
they possessed or could draw advantages from, which was true particularly among
smaller firms. A considerable part of the problems facing the firms of our sample
derived from what western businessmen saw as the unpredictable, if not downright
unjust, behaviour of local and regional authorities.
Taking into consideration the transnational region-building project of the Barents Euro-
Arctic Region, one might wonder to what extent this problematic business reality was
fed into and dealt with in political co-operation schemes. It would be unfair to say they
were not, but their treatment did not seem to make all that much difference to business
operators in the area. Political co-operation schemes were preoccupied with framework
conditions and regulatory role for government agencies. There was also a tendency to
focus on large-scale industrial restructuring and infrastructure improvements, in line
with the wishes of Russian regions, which were seldom even close to realisation for
financial and other reasons. Already ongoing activities and the problems facing those
involved were neglected, as firms’ experiences were not fed into the policy-making
process in any systematic way. Given the problems firms faced and the need they felt
for government backing, close and collaborative relations between public and private
actors in the region stood out as an untested potential in co-operation. The nursing of
such relations would have made sense if we accept the idea that such relations would be
particularly important in complicated business environments.
As it were, Russian regions’ treatment of foreign firms indicated little recognition
foreign investments as an important aspect of development, although their official
stance was strongly in favour of such activities. This contradiction seems to call for
arrangements for an exchange of knowledge and a dialogue about conditions for
transnational business development, the role of governments in general and in particular
about political co-operation schemes in the development of these activities. However,
while the sub-national government bodies of Russia stood out as problem-makers with a
great potential for causing foreign (and domestic) business operators severe harm, their
Nordic counterparts struggled with their roles in the policy networks of transnational
region-building. The described focus of co-operation, which was accepted at sub-
national levels, meant they devoted their limited resources to matters over which they
had very little influence.  The role of sub-national bodies became one of channelling11
information about developments in the area to central governments. Due to the limited
resources at regional bodies disposal, their dependency on central government approval
and financing was far too strong to make them driving forces in transnational region-
building, or even in mobilisation within sub-national regions.
A certain regionalisation of foreign policy in terms of sub-national involvement exists in
the three Nordic states, but resources and control usually remained with ministries for
foreign affairs. Only lesser amounts were canalised through sub-national government
bodies, while decisions on projects stayed at the central level. In particular Sweden
seemed centralist in its approach with a strong position for the foreign aid organisation.
Besides foreign policy, certain features of the Norwegian and Finnish strategies must be
considered potentially favourable for transnational region-building. The Finnish
gateway strategies signified broad government engagement in bilateral relations and
concern with the development of transnational relations. In Norway, foreign policy
objectives in the Barents Region coincided with certain objectives of regional and
industrial policy, marked by the establishment of a couple of investment funds, a
business service organisation and a business centre in Northwest Russia. Beyond
questioning, the high priority given to the Barents Region in Norwegian foreign policy,
regional policy, and even industrial policy, equips Norwegian firms with relatively
broad government backing.
Concerning the business content of bilateral policies, the Norwegian strategy placed
strong emphasis on ties between government bodies and firms and for an active role of
government in the development of Norwegian-Russian business. Sweden was more
restrictive in this respect, favouring general free-trade policies and improved
institutional conditions in the Russian market. Finland, on the contrary, took on a more
offensive stance and had the ambition to serve as a forerunner, and a co-designer, in the
development of Russian relations, which became even more evident with the Northern
Dimension initiative to be dealt with in the next section.
As a consequence of the institutional structure of co-operation in the Barents Region,
major resource dependencies developed between central governments in donor countries
and sub-national governments in Russian recipient regions. Sub-national government
bodies from the Nordic states were rather peripheral in the broader policy networks of
transnational region-building, being the nodes in rather poor and powerless networks at
the inter-regional level. For Russian sub-regions, which fostered linkages with both12
central and regional government bodies abroad, relations to the former category must be
considered much more valuable, given the prevalent circumstances.
Also the Tacis and Interreg programmes pointed to the potential interconnectedness of
regional and foreign policy interests on behalf of the EU. There was also an aspect of
multi-level governance in the EU approach, where measures clearly give a go-signal for
sub-national authorities within EU territory, not least in border areas. Most instruments
handled by DG 1, however, did not seem to bring about the multi-level notion in
relations across the external borders of the EU, and thus rarely equipped sub-national
governments with any additional resources for cross-border activities. Of the EU
instruments operating in the Euro-Arctic, Barents Interreg II seemed to allow regional
interests a stronger role in cross-border relations and emerging policy networks. Other
EU instruments belonging to the foreign policy field, although placing strong emphasis
on sub-national involvement in recipient territories, did not put such trust in the hands
of sub-national governments within its territory. Mobilisation effects were thus visible
mainly in Russian target regions. Even though EU influence in the Barents Rregion
increased with the Barents Interreg II, it also brought financial resources to sub-national
government in Sweden and Finland. Barents Interreg II thus illustrates the dynamics of
multi-level governance and the opportunities this created for sub-national levels of
government.
The scope for regionalisation as a device in the fostering of transnational learning
processes seems obvious. This would, however, require a certain matching of interests
across borders, which has proved difficult. Competition among Nordic bodies at
different levels, which seems to increase as business interests are brought into the
process, has raised suspicion on any attempt at co-ordinating measures. The majority of
actors involved in processes related to the development of transnational business simply
seemed to prefer bilateral relations. This may seem logical enough, but it has meant
limited leverage of transnational policy networks in matters of transnational business
development.
The Northern Dimension – A New Strategy in the Making
In 1997 Finland proposed the idea of a Northern Dimension of the EU’s external
relations with Eastern Europe and Russia. Since then the Finns have struggled to get
support from the EU and its member states for this overriding framework for east-west13
co-operation. The Northern Dimension has been rather illusive both in terms of
geography and policy which has left the field open for a number of interpretations and
speculations about the motives behind the initiative (cf. Haukkala, 1999; Joenniemi,
2000). In a recent Action Plan, the Northern Dimension’s geography is said to stretch
‘from Iceland on the west to North-West Russia, from the Norwegian, Barents and Kara
Seas in the North to the Southern coast of the Baltic Sea and has the backing of the EU
and the non-EU Northern Dimension partner countries Estonia, Iceland, Latvia,
Lithuania, Norway, Poland and the Russian Federation (Action Plan…). In line with the
standard rhetoric on east-west relations during the post-Cold War era, the initiative is
about stability, security, environmental problems and economic growth (cf. Hedegaard
& Lindström, 1999). The elusive content might have served the purpose of not upsetting
potential opponents before the idea is established among other EU policy instruments,
but it leave questions about what the contribution of the initiative might be unattended.
It was made clear from the beginning that no new institutions or new financing
instruments were required for the implementation of the Northern Dimension, rather
better co-ordination among existing institutions, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea
States (CBSS), the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), and
policy instruments (most notably Tacis, Phare and Interreg programmes), alongside with
a general upgrading of the EU’s role in the area were at the core of the initiative (cf. A
Northern Dimension for the Policies of the Union…). The response among member
states has not been overwhelming, but naturally somewhat stronger in Germany,
Denmark, and Sweden. One of the key headings in Sweden’s programme for its
chairmanship of the EU during spring 2001 deals with external relations. Further
development and concretisation of co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region is mentioned
as a priority, and the Northern Dimension is pointed out as a natural platform for these
efforts (Programme for the Swedish Chairmanship of the Council of Ministers).
The Helsinki European Council in December 1999 agreed to develop an action plan for
the Northern Dimension. The plan was developed during spring 2000 and agreed upon
by the European Council June meeting in Feira, Portugal. The Action Plan for the
Northern Dimension is so far the clearest signal about the substance of the initiative. In
its operational part the Action plan sets out the objectives and perspectives for action to
be commenced during year 2000-2003. The plan is characterised as a political
recommendation, which should be taken into account by relevant actors whenever14
appropriate. The promotion of positive interdependence and better co-ordinated action
and closer cooperation between all partners are overriding aims. Value added is
considered to be greatest in a large number of sectors, such as infrastructure (including
transport, energy and telecommunications), environment and nuclear safety, education,
research, training and human resources development, public health and administration,
cross-border co-operation, cross-border trade and investment as well as the fight against
(cross-border) crime.
Within each action area, activity priorities are exemplified. A couple of action areas
stand out as being of particular interest here. Concerning ‘Trade, Business Cooperation
and Investment Promotion’ it is pointed out that the business environment in the area,
and particularly in Russia, neither provide stability, predictability nor incentives for
SME development. Support to customs administration and creating a legal and
administrative environment for trade and investment stand out as a broad priority that
will be concretised during the implementation of Europe Agreements and the
Partnership for Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia and existing programmes.
Examples on what kind of activity each of the existing programmes allow for within this
field are then briefly given (Action Plan…, pp 25-27).
Another action area of particular interest here is that of ‘Regional and Cross-border
Cooperation’, which is said to be an essential element of the Northern Dimension.
References are made to the new Tacis regulation on cross-border cooperation,
INTERREG III programmes and Phare CBC programme. Participation in this field is
considered an important step in preparing for EU membership since it help actors in
potential member states develop their skills and capacities in project management. It is
also here called for consistency between existing programmes and that all relevant
bodies and EU institutions should be engaged in such efforts and that procedure for such
activity should be agreed upon between the institutions. Further development of
networks between a wide range of actors and cross-border institution-building along the
lines of EUREGIOs are seen as important in this context. The sub-national level is seen
as important in improving services and local democracy, and existing cooperation
structures, most notably the CBSS and BEAC are seen as important in implementing
cross-border activities in line with the intentions of the Northern Dimension. In
describing actions, examples are given on how cross-border instruments within Tacis,
Phare and the Structural Funds can be used to forward the intentions of the Northern15
Dimension. Despite the emphasis on regional and cross-border cooperation, the role of
sub-national government bodies is not considered in any detail, neither is the multi-level
dynamics of such arrangements elaborated.
In sum, the Action Plan repeatedly emphasise the co-ordinating role of the Northern
Dimension. In light of the results presented in the previous section, there is definitely a
need for such co-ordination. The Action Plan indicates, rather than becomes explicit, on
how this may be achieved. The idea, as expressed above is that relevant actors should
take the ideas of the Northern Dimension into account when preparing for project within
the EU or its member states’ programmes. Procedures for this are not explained in the
document and it remain unclear to what extent the Northern Dimension is conceived of
as a steering instrument for other programmes, or if it is an overriding strategy for east-
west cooperation put together by bits and pieces of existing policy instruments.
Somehow the status of the Northern Dimension is not fully explained, sometimes it
seems superior, sometimes subordinated, to existing instruments. If co-ordination is the
major benefit of the Northern Dimension, explicit indications on how this would come
about are still to be seen.
Apart from the Northern Dimension initiative, existing instruments for cooperation are
undergoing changes independently of the emergence of the Northern Dimension. Tacis
support to the New Independent States (NIS) continues with new priorities after what is
described as a wide-ranging review. Emphasis is now on greater concentration,
differentiated country programmes, and support that match the objectives of Partnership
and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs). In implementing the programming there is a shift
from ‘demand-driven’ to ‘dialogue-driven’ programming and the creation of an
‘incentive’ scheme for improving the quality of assistance. Higher priority will during
the period be given to promotion of investment, which before was very limited within
Tacis. Among the increased number of instruments announced, the use of twinnings
between EU and NIS institutions and industrial units is particularly mentioned (cf.
European Commission – Explanatory Memorandum).
The Phare Programme, which has been main instrument in EU’s financial and technical
cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe, will now be refocused and reoriented to
support in preparation for EU membership in the ten applicant countries. These ten
countries have also entered so called Accession Partnerships, in which Phare is one
component in a package of support. In partner countries, Phare is now concentrated on16
institution-building and investment for bringing public administrations, industry and
infrastructure closer to the EU standards. The Accession Partnership function is thus an
attempt to design individual plans for each of the countries (based on their needs as
understood by the Commission and as expressed in their membership applications) and
to better co-ordinate support for accomplishing this (cf. European Commission –
Enlargement). Two new accession instruments – ISPA and SAPARD – will be used to
prepare candidate countries within the fields of environment, transport and rural
development.
According to this brief overview of existing instruments, cooperation will be based on
country-specific strategies. This may seem contradictory in comparison with the
intentions of the Northern Dimension, but not necessarily so. As long as country
strategies are targeted towards similar aspects of government and society, these might
add up to a comprehensive strategy, even if problems and instruments for their
improvement may be designed differently. But then again, is it relevant to speak of the
Northern Dimension as a guiding instrument in its own right, or is it deemed to be based
on the lowest common denominator of existing programmes?
Conclusion – Arguments for an investment-oriented approach to the Northern
Dimension
If we accept the far from controversial conclusion that foreign investors need to tackle a
problem reality in Eastern Europe and Russia that has a distinct political dimension to it,
it seems logical that these issues make it to the agenda of political co-operation. Many
of the EU initiatives towards Russian and Eastern Europe also place emphasis on the
development of economic co-operation, and point to improved conditions for foreign
investments as part the package. When it comes to instruments for achieving this,
programme texts usually settles for support in carrying out legislative reforms. The
argument here is that co-operation schemes could give assistance with the creation and
implementation of decent investment policies top priority. Assistance during reforms of
legislation and regulations is a part of this, but just as important is the conduct of public
authorities in handling this framework. Partly the role of governments could be to foster
exchange of knowledge and a dialogue, i.e. learning processes, about conditions for
transnational business development and the role of government in the development of
these activities. The identification and management of resource-dependencies between17
governments in different countries, and between firms and governments, would be at the
heart of such a strategy.
On the basis of results from research into developments in the Barents Region, a need
for closer ties between transnational firms and political co-operation structures seemed
obvious. In a sense, firms need to be appreciated as key actors in the development of
East-West relations. Feedback from business actors about the problem reality they face
in foreign locations and analysis of the political component of problems could be
important input in diplomatic relations at all levels. This requires political access for
firms in emerging co-operation structures and the readiness in these structures to deal
with the problems of the individual firm if necessary. Political co-operation schemes
thus need to strengthen relationships with investors and be willing to give them political
support, rather than financial support.
As part of the investment-oriented approach, better co-ordination of co-operation
efforts between different levels of government within the European Union, as well as
between the EU and other governments is needed. Developments in the Barents Region
so far have shown a tendency for competition between the bilateral strategies of the
Nordic states and their sub-regions for favourable relations to Russia and its regions.
Under the prevailing circumstances, this has proved very inefficient in the sense that
contrasting, rather than common interests, has shaped the processes at hand. Not only
governments and their activities needs to be linked and co-ordinated, issue linkages
should be made explicit, were developments in the field of economic co-operation could
have consequences, positive and negative, for measures taken in other policy areas. Put
differently, unjust treatment of foreign investors would have consequences for a
particular country or region’s possibilities of attaining support from the EU also in other
matters. Because of the prevalent circumstances Russia and Eastern European states are
today faced with a situation were too few are willing to invest in their futures. This is to
a great extent because of bad management, not least of foreign investors and project
owners. Given the magnitude of support directed to these countries during their
transition, such conduct should not be accepted. Energy, nuclear safety and
improvement of infrastructure are examples of high priority issues in the suggested
Northern Dimension, where improvements largely depend on the investment climate.
The Northern Dimension initiative could play an important role in co-ordinating
measures with a bearing on investment conditions among the existing EU programmes18
and agreements. Co-ordination of activities related to investment conditions within the
frames of existing co-operation programmes and organisations, such as the CBSS and
BEAC, as well as the bilateral relations between the EU and its member-states and
Eastern Europe, including Russia, would be a concrete and purposeful function of the
Northern Dimension.
Since there is a need for all sorts of co-ordination, and potentially also for a division of
labour, between government bodies at different levels, the multi-level governance
notion might have some bearing on this problem. Sub-national levels of government
may be sub-ordinate to other levels, but as the Barents Region study has shown, they
may be a pawn in the game also across the external borders of the EU. The scope for
sub-national levels of government is connected with their ability to become vital
components in the cross-border networks of transnational firms, and particular SMEs
from their regions. In the Barents Region case, this possibility were not tried out and
sub-national governments were mainly partners in dialogue within certain confines and
with poor prospects to become truly operative actors under prevailing circumstances.
This is not to suggest that activation of sub-national government bodies is the solution
to the problems of east-west integration. Results may, as in the Barents Region case, be
meagre when put under scrutiny, but not to make use of the sub-national dimension of
cross-border developments certainly means forgoing important opportunities. By
working out a way of placing territorial interest alliances of different levels in dialogues
with each other about viable paths of future co-operation, a true multi-level dynamic
may be set in motion. This might be a fruitful path to a sensible division of labour
between levels of government with different objectives and responsibilities, but also
common interests to advance in a more systematic way. None of the ideas brought
forward here are in conflict with the existing policies of the EU, they rather stress the
necessity of making foreign direct investment a key concern in the fostering of east-west
relations. Further integration and increased welfare in partner countries hinges on
foreign and domestic investments.
                                                
1 These two sections of this paper draws heavily on the PhD project Politics and Business in the Barents
Region, which was presented in a book with the same title (Svensson, 1998).
2 Transnational relations emerged during the 1970s as different sub-disciplines met in an attempt to break
the domination of state and security dominated research in international affairs. A special issue of the
journal International Organization entitled ‘Transnational Relations and World Politics’ edited by Robert
O. Keohane and Josesph S. Nye manifested the breakthrough of this research. Apart from TNC’s interest
was directed towards revolutionary movements, trade unions, scientific networks, international air
transport cartels and communications activities in outer space. In later years environmental problems and19
                                                                                                                                              
crime has gained increased attention as transnational phenomena. For a long time the perspective seemed
to have withered away, but with the seemingly unstoppable growth of transnational activity, the
perspective seems to have resurfaced in later years even though its impact should not be exaggerated (cf.
Risse-Kappen, 1995).
3 This has been pointed out in Peterson, M. J. (1992: 373) and Stopford & Strange (1993: 20). The same
shortcoming has been observed in integration theory and recently inspired a doctoral dissertation on the
topic at London School of Economics and Political Science (Thompson, 1995).
4 The original Rhodes framework contain five propositions: 1) Any organization is dependent upon other
organisations for resources. 2) In order to achieve their goals, the organizations have to exchange
resources. 3) Although decision-making within the organization is constrained by other organizations, the
dominant coalition retains some discretion. The appreciative system of the dominant coalition influences
which relationships are seen as a problem and which resources will be sought. 4) The dominant coalition
employs strategies within known rules of the game to regulate the process of exchange. 5) Variations in
the degree of discretion are a product of the goals and the relative power potential of interacting
organizations. This relative power is a product of the resources of each organization, of the rules of the
game, and of the process of exchange between organizations. (Rhodes, 1981; emphasis in original).
5 Anderson (1990), Peterson (1995) and Rhodes (several) are counted among the strong proponents of
such a focus. Good overviews of the uses of governance can be found in Rhodes (1996) and (1997).
6 According to Marks, this pattern appeared firstly in the 1984 design of the Integrated Mediterranean
Programs, to be extended and refined in the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds (Marks, 1992: 209).
7 It is well documented that political actors at local and regional level increasingly operate across national
borders to forward their interests and have usually been observed in federal states, such as the US,
Canada, Australia, and Germany (Michelmann & Soldatos, 1990; Hocking, 1993). In the context of
European integration it is becoming obvious that this is the tendency also in unitary states, such as the
Nordic countries (Jerneck, 1993; Bogason, et. al., 1995).
8 FDI’s are investments ‘where a firm from one country buys a controlling investment in a in another
country or where a firm from one country sets up a branch or subsidiary company in another country’
(Dicken, 1992: 87). Unlike portfolio investments, FDI’s ‘involves the transfer of a package of resources
[…] across national borders, the de jure governance of which continues to remain in the hands of the
transferring firms or […] is shared with the transferring firm’ (Dunning, 1993: 13).
9 Findings presented in this section are based on the conclusions of a PhD project (cf. Svensson, 1998).
10 Personal interviews were carried out with 30 Nordic businessmen representing firms with investment
activity in the North-Western Russia part of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region.20
References:
Anderson, J. J. (1990) ‘Sceptical Reflections on a Europe of the Regions: Britain, Germany,
and the ERDF’. Journal of Public Policy 10(4): 417-447.
Atkinson, M. & Coleman, W. (1992) ‘Policy Networks, Policy Communities and the
Problem of Governance’. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and
Administration 5(2): 154-180.
Baldwin, D. A. (1980) ‘Interdependence and power: a conceptual analysis’. International
Organisation 34(4): 471-506.
Benson, J. K. (1982) ‘A Framework for Policy Analysis’ in D. Rogers, D. Whitten and
Associates Interorganisational Coordination. Ames, IO: Iowa State University Press.
Benz, A. (1996) ‘German Regions in the European Union: From Joint Policy-Making to
Multi-Level Governance’ in P. LeGalès & C. Lequesne (eds.) (1998) Regions in Europe.
London and New York: Routledge.
Bogason, et. al. (1995) Regionalt utvecklingsarbete i brytningstid. Transnationellt samarbete
på regional nivå i de nordiska länderna. Stockholm: NordREFO Working Papers 1995:1.
Brewer, T. L. (1993) ‘Government Policies, Market Imperfections and Foreign Direct
Investment’, Journal of International Business Studies, 24(1): 101-120.
Camilleri, J. A. & Falk, J. (1992) - The End of Sovereignity?  (Aldershot: Edward Elgar).
Cappelin, R. & Batey, P. W. J. (eds.) (1993) Regional Networks, Border Regions and
European Integration. Lion: Pion Ltd.
Coleman, W. D. & Jacek, H.J. (eds.) (1989) Regionalism, Business Interests and Public
Policy. London: Sage Publications.
Conzelmann, T. (1995) ‘Networking and the Politics of EU Regional Policy’, Regional and
Federal Studies, 5(2): 134-172.
Dicken, P. (1992) Global Shift: The Internationalization of Economic Activity, 2
nd edition.
London: Paul Chapman Publishing House.
Dowding, K. (1995) ‘Model or Metaphor? A Critical Review of the Policy Network
Approach’, Political Studies, XLIII: 136-158.
Duchacek, I. D. (1990) ‘Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New Actors in
International Relations’ in H. J. Michelmann & P. Soldatos (eds.) Federalism and
International Relations - The Role of Subnational Units. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Dunning. J. H. (1992) ‘The competitive advantage of countries and the activities of
transnational corporations’. Transnational Corporations 1(1): 135-168.
Fujita, M. (1995) ‘Small and Medium-sized Transnational Corporations: Trends and
Patterns of Foreign Direct Investment’ Small Business Economics 7: 183-204.
Haukkala, H. (1999) ’Introduction’, in Haukkala, H. (ed.) Dynamics Aspects of the Northern
Dimension, Turku: Jean Monnet Unit, University of Turku.
Hedegaard, L. & B. Lindström (1999) ’The Northern Dimension, Russia and Prospects for
NEBI Integration’, in: Hedegaard, L. & B. Lindström (eds.) The NEBI Yearbook 1999.
North European and Baltic Sea Integration, Berlin: Springer Verlag.
Heineldt, H. & Smith, R. (1996) Policy Networks and European Structural Funds.
Aldershot: Avebury.21
Hocking, B. (1993) Localizing Foreign Policy: Non-Central Governments and Multilayered
Diplomacy. New York: St. Martins Press.
Hooghe, L. (1995) ‘Subnational Mobilization in the European Union’ in J. Hayward (ed.)
The Crisis of Representation in Europe. London: Frank Cass.
Hooghe, L. (ed.) (1996) Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-Level
Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hooghe, L. & Keating, M. (1994) ‘The politics of European Union regional policy’ Journal
of European Public Policy 1(3): 367-393.
Jeffrey, J, (ed.) (1996) ‘The Regional Dimension of the European Union. Towards a Third
Level in Europe?’, Regional and Federal Studies, special issue, 6(2).
Jerneck, M. (1993) ‘Malmö – Porten till kontinenten? En maktstudie av en
internationaliserad storstad’ in L-G. Stenelo & B. Norrving (eds.) Lokal makt. Lund: Lund
University Press.
Joenniemi, P. (2000) The European Union’s Northern Dimension: On the Introduction of a
New Signifier, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), Paper presented at the
International Studies Association (ISA) Congress, Los Angeles, March 14-18, 2000.
Jones, R. B. J. (1995) Globalisation and Interdependence in the International Political
Economy. Rhetoric and Reality. London: Pinter Publishers.
Keating, M. (1998) The New Regionalism in Western Europe: territorial restructuring and
political change. London: Elgar.
Keating, M. & Jones, B. (ed.) (1985) Regions in the European Community. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Keating, M. & Loughlin, J. (eds.) (1997) The Political Economy of Regionalism. London:
Frank Cass.
Kenis, P. & Schneider, V. (1991) ‘Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New
Analytical Toolbox’ in B. Marin & R. Mayntz Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and
Theoretical Considerations. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag.
Keohane, R. O. & Nye, J. S. (1989) Power and Interdependence, 2
nd edition. New York:
Harper Collins Publishers.
Kooiman, J. (ed.) (1993) Modern Governance. New Government-Society Interactions.
London: Sage Publications.
Kresl, P. K. (1992) ‘The response of European cities to EC 1992’, Journal of European
Integration, 15(2-3).
LeGalès, P. & Lequesne, C. (eds.) (1998) Regions in Europe.   London and New York:
Routledge.
Leonardi, R. (ed.) (1993) The Regions and the European Community. The Regional
Response to the Single Market in the Underdeveloped Areas. London: Frank Cass.
Marks, G. (1992) ‘Structural Policy in the European Community’ in A. M. Sbragia (ed.)
Europolitics: Institutions and Policymaking in the “New” European Community.
Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution.
Marks, G. (1993) ‘Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC’ in A. W. Cafruny
& G. G. Rosenthal (eds.) The State of the European Community (volume 2). The22
Maastricht Debates and Beyond. Lynne Rienners Publishers, Longman.
Marks, G. (1996) ‘An Actor-Centered Approach to Multi-Level Governance’. Regional and
Federal Studies 6(2): 20-38.
Marsh, D. & Rhodes, R. A. W. (1992b) ‘Policy Communities and Issue Networks. Beyond
Typology’ in D. Marsh & R. A. W. Rhodes (eds.)  Policy Networks in British Government.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Michelmann, H. J. & Soldatos, P. (eds.) (1990) Federalism and International Relations. The
Role of Subnational Units. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Peterson, J. (1995) ‘Policy Networks and European Union Policy Making: A Reply to
Kassim’. West European Politics 18(2): 389-407.
Peterson, M. J. (1992) ‘Transnational Activity, International Society and World Politics’.
Millenium: Journal of International Studies 21(3): 371-388.
Ratti, R. & Reichman, S. (eds.) (1993) Theory and Practice of Transborder Cooperation.
Basel and Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
Rhodes, M. (ed.) (1995b) ‘Introduction: the regions and the new Europe’ in M. Rhodes (ed.)
The Regions and the new Europe. Patterns in core and periphery development.
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Rhodes, R. A. W. (1981) Control and Power in Central-Local Government Relationships.
Farnborough: Gower.
Rhodes, R. A. W. (1988) Beyond Westminster and Whitehall. The Sub-Central Governments
of Britain. London: Unwin-Hyman.
Rhodes, M. (ed.) (1995c) ‘Conclusions: the viability of regional strategies’ in M. Rhodes
(ed.) The Regions and the new Europe. Patterns in core and periphery development.
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Rhodes, R. A. W. (1996) ‘The New Governance: Governing without Government’. Political
Studies, XLIV, 652-667.
Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997) Understanding Governance. Policy Networks, Governance,
Reflexivity and Accountability. Buckingham, Phil.: Open University Press.
Risse-Kappen, T. (ed.) (1995) Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-state Actors,
Domestic Structures and International Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Sally, R. (1995) States and Firms. Multinational enterprises in institutional competition.
London: Routledge.
Stopford, J. (1994) ‘The growing interdependence between transnational corporations and
Governments’, Transnational Corporations, 3(1): 53-76.
Stopford, J. & Strange, S. (1993) Rival states, rival firms. Competition for world market
shares. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Svensson, B. (1998) Politics and Business in the Barents Region, Stockholm: Fritzes.
Wilks, S. & Wright, M. (ed.) (1987) Comparative Government-Industry Relations – Western
Europe, the United States, and Japan. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Thompson, E. R. (1995) The Role of British business in European Union political
integration: Neofunctional theory tested against corporate strategy (doctoral dissertation).23
London: London School of Economics and Political Science.
Östhol, A. (1996) Politisk integration och gränsöverskridande regionbildning i Europa
(Political Integration and Cross-Border Region-Building in Europe. Doctoral dissertation).
Umeå: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Umeå Universitet.
Other printed and internet-published sources:
European Commission Explanatory Memorandum, (14/6)
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/nis/reg_99/memo/index.htm)
European Commission: Enlargement/ What is Tacis?
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/site/contacts/phare_tacis_info_centre.htm)
European Commission – Enlargement, Pre-Accession Strategy
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/aps.htm)
A Northern Dimension for the Policies of the Union: An Inventory of Current Activities,
Finnish Presidency, 22/02/00. (http://presidency.finland.fi/doc/liite/intervenen.rtf)
Action Plan for the Northern Dimension with external and cross-border policies of the
European Union 2000-2003, The European Commission, DG E VII.
Programme for the Swedish Chairmanship of the Council of Ministers, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Stockholm.